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Abstract—Big data analytics has been regarded as a promising technology to yield better insights into future development by
government and industry. Data collection and aggregation are necessary pre-steps to enable data analysis. However, data may be
dispersed across multiple places and in different formats. Even worse, data can be encrypted under various encryption mechanisms
when data owners try to secure the confidentiality of the data. This makes data aggregation extremely challenging, if not impossible,
especially when the encryption keys cannot be shared for various reasons. In this paper, we take the first step in addressing this
problem. More specifically, we propose a new notion of cross-domain encryption switching service that securely bridges two
well-studied encryption mechanisms, namely traditional public key encryption and identity-based encryption. As of independent
interest, our notion supports keyword search over encrypted data, i.e. after encryption switching one may search over the (outsourced)
data without loss of data and query secrecy. We provide a provably-secure instantiation satisfying the notion, and further present the
efficiency analysis to show the scalability. Our proposed scheme may be applicable in multi-domain cloud storage system.
Index Terms—Cross-domain encryption switching service, keyword search service, data secrecy, search privacy.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
End-to-end encryption has been seen as one of the secure so-
lutions to protect the confidentiality of sensitive data while
the data is outsourced and transferred in open network, like
some of the real-world applications (e.g, cloud-based data
storage and retrieval). The fast-paced growth of cloud-based
applications urges the need of the flexibility of encryption,
especially in the era of big data. Proxy re-encryption (PRE)
[1], as a useful extension of public key encryption (PKE), for-
malizes an elegant approach to allow a semi-trusted proxy
to transform ciphertexts among different data users. Given
a re-encryption key, the proxy can convert a ciphertext
intended for Alice to Bob, while maintaining the secrecy
of the underlying plaintext and secret keys of both parties.
Being seen as a ciphertext switching service, PRE has many
practical applications, such as digital right management [2]
and secure email forwarding [1]. For instance, manager Al-
ice delegates her email decryption rights to secretary Helen
by uploading a special key to email server before her annual
leave, so that all Alice’s encrypted email received during the
leave can be gained access and read by Helen with Helen’s
decryption key. However, most of the existing PRE services
deal with the conversion of ciphertexts under the same type
of encryption, for example, an attribute-based encryption
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[3] can be only converted to the “same” encrypted format,
which makes sense if this conversion service is only required
within the same encryption system.
There are scenarios that cross-system ciphertext con-
version service is desirable. Consider a health-care agent
attempts to tailor a therapy plan for a patient. To do so,
the agent needs to collect data of the patient (e.g., electronic
health record, mental health report, employment data) from
various data sources (belonging to different authorities),
such as hospital, medical centre and even gym centre. But
the data may be encrypted and stored in remote cloud and
meanwhile, data is encrypted under different encryption
systems. A naive way for the agent to “aggregate” the data
(in which he is interested) is to request the corresponding
decryption keys from the respective data handlers. This,
however, yields concerns on data privacy. The data handlers
may question: “If I give you the key, how could you guarantee
that the key will not be further leaked to others or be further used
for other purposes?”
This paper attempts to tackle the dilemma technically so
that the agent can convert ciphertext from one encryption
system to another without requesting secret keys from the
data handlers. In particular, this paper considers the conver-
sion service between two types of well-studied encryption
systems, PKE and identity-based encryption (IBE). We here
take medical record sharing service as a motivation of this
work.
Assume Hospital X and Hospital Y use different policy
rules (Rule PKE and Rule IBE) to handle their patients’
medical data, and the data is stored with encrypted form
in cloud. Since patient transfer is common case among
hospitals. We suppose there is a patient that needs to be
transferred from Hospital X to Hospital Y. Right after patient
transfer, the electronic health record of the patient must be
also delivered to Hospital Y immediately. If the medical data
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is not encrypted, it can be shared between the hospitals
easily (see Fig. 1). While the record is encrypted under Rule
PKE, a direct access to the data is impossible for Hospital Y.
Meanwhile, the encryption mechanism used by Hospital X
and the corresponding decryption key may be unknown to
Hospital Y. This leads Hospital Y to a question ”how could it
gain access to the patient’s record?”.
Fig. 1: Electronic Medical Record Sharing Among Hospitals.
Naive Solutions. One may leverage a trivial “decrypt-then-
re-encrypt” solution in the sense that a trusted third party,
holding Hospital X decryption key, may decrypt the record
on behalf of Hospital X and then re-encrypt it under Rule
IBE so that Hospital Y can read the record. However, this
solution directly leaks the record to party, which is not a
real privacy-preserving solution.
PRE would possibly come to help here. But the exist-
ing bidirectional PRE schemes (e.g., [4]) are defined with
a restriction that the conversion can only be done with
the input/output ciphertexts under the same encryption
system. That is, Hospital X and Hospital Y must share the
same policy rule. Accordingly, bidirectional PRE is infeasible
solution since Rule PKE 6= Rule IBE in our scenario.
As of independent interest, patient record archiving and
retrieval are basic needs for hospital. For example, Hospital
Y may first locate the patient’s record before decrypting. It is
necessary to maintain secure data search while supporting
encryption switching service. One may think that trivially
twisting PRE with public key encryption with keyword
search (PEKS) [5] could become a handy solution. However,
the straightforward combination makes two parts (the en-
crypted data and search part) loosely independent such that
malicious cloud server can replace either of the parts with
dummy component (which may lead to ”always failure of
search match”). Accordingly, Hospital Y may not retrieve
any data with predefined keywords from cloud, which
jeopardizes data usability.
This paper targets to tackle the following problem: “How
to provide cross-domain encryption switching service, between
PKE and IBE, while supporting secure data search service.”
Contributions. In this work, we conduct the first study on
a brand new cloud-based service - how to achieve cross-
domain encryption switching with keyword search. Our
study spans both bidirectional ciphertext transformation
and searchable encryption perspectives for completeness.
Inspired by the features of PRE service and public key en-
cryption with keyword search (PEKS), we introduce a new
notion, which is called Cross-Domain Encryption Switching
with Keyword Search (CDSS). The notion is a bidirectional
conversion bridge between PKE and IBE and meanwhile,
the conversion maintains searchability. In particular, a PKE
ciphertext can be transformed into the IBE one, and further
be decrypted with the corresponding IBE decryption algo-
rithm, and vice versa. Besides, all ciphertext formats (IBE,
PKE and switching ciphertexts) support keyword search
query. Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
• We, for the first time, define the notion (algorithm
definition and security model) of cross-domain en-
cryption switching with keyword search.
• We construct a concrete CDSS protocol between a
PKE scheme and an IBE scheme, which satisfies the
new notion.
• We define the chosen plaintext security and chosen
keyword security models for the notion, and further
prove the security of the presented protocol in ran-
dom oracle model.
• We simulate our protocol on a file system. When the
number of files is up to 6000, the time to generate the
switching key and the ciphertext is about 70 seconds
and 100 seconds, respectively. The efficiency analysis
(see Section 8) shows both computational cost and
communication cost of our CDSS protocol.
Applications. We state that our new design CDSS can be ap-
plied to many real-world cloud-based service applications.
First of all, the example we use previously, the encrypted
electronic health record sharing, is an appropriate area
where the CDSS may be employed to. Encrypted email for-
warding may be another practical application. Imagine that
an encrypted email needs to go through two gateways for
a successful delivery, in which the gateways are equipped
with different encryption mechanisms. CDSS could be used
as a compiler to smoothly turn an incoming encrypted
message to the format matching the requirement of the
entrance gateway. Digital contents transfer is also a po-
tential application for CDSS. While transferring ownership
(of digital property) from one party to another one, the
legal representative of the original owner may make use
of CDSS to fulfil secure content delivery without ”read” the
underlying contents. Last but not least, CDSS may be used
as a plug-in for browser to display encrypted web content in
the case where web content is encrypted under a standard
encryption but web user customizes a different encryption
mechanism for local browser.
2 RELATED WORK
Switching Protocol. The primitive of encryption switching
protocol (ESP) was introduced by Couteau et al. [6] to
allow two players to interactively and obliviously convert
an encryption to the other, for any polynomial number
of switches, in any direction. Castagnos et al. [7] further
improved and instantiated ESP based on Couteau et al.’s
solid work. ESP is essentially a two-party computation pro-
tocol by leveraging cryptographic tools (e.g., homomorphic
schemes). ESP makes use of shared decryption keys to obliv-
iously decrypt and re-encrypt under the other encryption
scheme, with a similar public key. ESP does not conform our
scenario which requires a switch party to convert a cipher-
text with a switch key. Also, ESP achieved an encryption
switching without the property of search.
Inter/Cross-domain encryption. Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss
[1] introduced the concept of PRE to tackle inter-domain
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ciphertext alteration, so that a new altered ciphertext may
be decrypted by other users. PRE can be classified as:
unidirectional and bidirectional PRE, and single-hop and
multi-hop PRE, where the definitions are given in [8]. Many
variants have been proposed to improve the flexibility and
scalability of PRE and they focus on the single-hop bidirec-
tional case [9]. These works include conditional PRE (CPRE)
[10], identity-based PRE (IB-PRE) [11], [12], attribute-based
PRE (AB-PRE) [13]. A hybrid PRE scheme (in general) was
proposed [14] to unidirectional link ABE to IBE. This is the
first cross-domain encryption scheme. The aforementioned
AB-PRE schemes are weakly defined with CPA security. [15]
achieved CCA security with any monotonic access struc-
tures and [16] further designed a functional PRE supporting
deterministic finite automata. In fact, these AB-PRE schemes
were built on top of attribute-based encryption [3], which
was introduced to provide a more expressive way for data
sharing [17], [18], [19]. However, previous cross-domain
encryption schemes cannot bidirectionally bridge two types
of encryption mechanisms. Moreover, they fail to support
the search function in encryption switching.
Keyword Search. Song et al. proposed (symmetric) search-
able encryption (SSE)to allow search over encrypted data
using an encrypted keyword. Boneh et al. [5] seminally
introduced the notion of PEKS to address the issues of
the encrypted data sharing and complicated key manage-
ment in SSE. Afterwards, combinable multi-keyword search
schemes have been proposed to provide more expressive-
ness in search, such as public-key encryption scheme with
conjunctive keyword search (PECKS), e.g, [20], [21], [22],
and public key encryption with temporary keyword search
(PETKS) [23]. To improve keyword privacy (i.e. adversary
cannot guess what embedded into a given search trapdoor
is), secure channel free-PEKS (SCF-PEKS) schemes [24], [25]
and searchable encrypted keywords against insider attakcs
(CR-IA) [25], [26] were proposed to resist outsider and insid-
er attacks, respectively. Public key encryption with oblivious
keyword search (PEOKS) [27] and public key encryption
with authorized keyword search (PEAKS) [28], [29], [30]
were proposed to permit authorized private search. How-
ever, these searchable encryption schemes cannot directly
support the switching function of different mechanisms.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 System Model
We show the frame work of CDSS in Fig. 2, which consists
of an IBE system, a PKE system and a switching entity.
Fig. 2: CDSS Framework.
• IBE System deals with data encrypted under IBE
format, where the IBE ciphertext is searchable.
• PKE System deals with data encrypted under PKE
format, where the PKE ciphertext is searchable.
• Switching Entity, which is represented by a switching
router, can bidirectionally execute the transformation
of the ciphertexts belonging to different domains.
That is, the switching entity can convert an IBE ci-
phertext form (i.e. original domain) into a PKE cipher-
text form (i.e. current domain), so that the switching
ciphertext can be searched and decrypted with the
PKE decryption algorithm; and vice versa.
3.2 Threat Model
This paper focuses on IBE and PKE systems, and regards
their searchable cross-domain transformation as the main
target. Assume that each plaintext is associated with a
keyword (or a set of keyword) and is encrypted into the
corresponding ciphertext via the encryption algorithm in
original domain (either IBE or PKE).
Our system requires that some common parameters are
pre-generated in the system initialization. The original do-
main and the current domain are built on these parame-
ters and all associated operations including switching use
the same public information. Our threat model makes the
following assumptions. First, all of public keys and data
streams transferred in the public channel are accessible. Sec-
ond, each identity or keyword used in this paper is a short
string which may suffer from brute-force guessing attacks.
Third, we do not consider any collusion of entities from
different domains. Finally, we assume the service provider
to be a trust party who holds the master secret key, such that
it can decrypt any IBE ciphertext.
We consider the cross-domain encryption switching that
maintains retrieval function to execute keyword search be-
fore decryption. Assume that there exists an “honest-but-
curious” adversary that follows specifications but attempts
to compromise data and its associated keyword based on
the following attacks: (i) The chosen plaintext attack models a
case in which the adversary knows some of ciphertexts for
arbitrary plaintexts (including original-domain ciphertext
and current-domain ciphertext) and guesses the underlying
plaintext. (ii) The chosen keyword attack models the case
where an adversary knows some of the ciphertexts for ar-
bitrary keywords (including original-domain ciphertext and
current-domain ciphertext) and guesses the used keyword.
4 ALGORITHM DEFINITION
We formally define CDSS as follows. The notations used in
this paper is defined in Table 1.
TABLE 1: Notations.
pp System public parameters.
M Message.
w Keyword.
msk,mpk Master secret/public key.
ID User identity.
skIBE , pkIBE IBE secret/public key.
skPKE , pkPKE PKE secret/public key.
EPKE PKE ciphertext
rkIBE-PKE IBE-PKE switch key.
EIBE-PKE IBE-PKE switch ciphertext
rkPKE-IBE PKE-IBE switch key.
EPKE-IBE PKE-IBE switch ciphertext
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Definition 1. Under pp, a CDSS protocol includes the following
algorithms.
• Setup. Taking as input a security parameter λ, it
outputs the master secret key msk and the master
public key mpk. Assume mpk is implicitly included
in the following algorithms.
• KeyGen. Taking as input a description δ and an
alternative msk (it is necessary in IBE but not in
PKE), it outputs a secret/public key pair (skδ , δ).
• Encrypt. Taking as input δ, the message M ∈ GT and
a keyword w ∈ {0, 1}∗, it outputs the ciphertext Eδ .
• Switch KeyGenδ−ξ. Taking as input either the tuple
(skδ , ξ) or the tuple (skξ ,δ) and msk, it outputs a
switch key rkδ−ξ , where δ and ξ are distinct descrip-
tions.
• Switch. Taking as input the tuple (rkδ−ξ , Eδ), it
outputs the ciphertext Eδ−ξ .
• Trapdoor. Taking as input skξ and w, it outputs the
trapdoor T ξ .
• Test. Taking as input Eδ−ξ and T ξ , it outputs 1 if
there is a match, and 0 otherwise.
• Decrypt. Taking as input Eδ−ξ and skξ , it outputs M ,
or ⊥ indicating a fail decryption.
5 FORMAL SECURITY MODELS
An adversary may follow specifications but try to compro-
mise the underlying data and its associated keyword. The
adversary can take some misbehaves, including the possi-
ble parameters accessing (the details can be found in the
following queries). We also need two further assumptions.
One is that the identity and the keyword may be guessed by
the brute force attack, and the other is that no target secret
information is available.
A CDSS protocol should guarantee security in two re-
spects: the message secrecy and the keyword secrecy. For
the former, we prevent an adversary, who is not given a
valid secret key for decryption, from gaining access to the
underlying message of both the original and the switched
ciphertexts. For the latter, we need to guarantee that an
adversary, without being given a valid trapdoor for search,
cannot access the keyword from both the original and the
switched ciphertexts. We build the security model with two
games between an adversary A and a challenger C, we call
them the chosen plaintext attack (CPA) game and the chosen
keyword attack (CKA) game.
5.1 Data Secrecy Model
Game 1. A CDSS achieves the data secrecy (also known as CPA
security) if satisfying that A cannot distinguish the message from
the ciphertext and the switch ciphertext even though A is allowed
to adaptively conduct some queries with restrictions.
Setup. C gives pp,mpk to A.
Phase 1. A issues the following queries.
PKE Key Query. A sends any PKE key query to C. C runs
the KeyGenPKE algorithm. C returns the public key pkPKE
for the target description, and returns the public/secret key
pairs for any non-target descriptions.
IBE Key Query. A sends ID to C. C runs the KeyGenIBE
algorithm and returns the secret key skIBE and the public
key pkIBE .
Switch Key Query. A sends pkδ, pkξ, w to C, where pkξ is the
target public key. C runs the Switch KeyGen algorithm and
returns the switch key rkδ−ξ , where we require that δ and
ξ are from different domains. Namely, if δ represents IBE,
while ξ represents PKE; vice versa.
Challenge. Once A decides that the Phase 1 is over, it
submits two equal-length messages M0,M1, any keyword
w and two description δ∗, ξ∗, where δ∗, ξ∗ are restricted to
be from different domains. A is restricted that he has only
queried the switch key from any δ to the target ξ∗, and
has queried neither the secret key for decryption for any
description δ∗ or ξ∗. C flips a coin  ∈ {0, 1} and returns the
challenge ciphertext for (δ∗,M) and the switch ciphertext
for (ξ∗,M).
Phase 2. As Phase 1 with the condition established in
challenge phase.
Guess. A outputs a guess ′ for .
A wins Game1 if ′ = .
5.2 Search Keyword Secrecy Model
Game 2. A CDSS achieves the search keyword secrecy (also
known as CKA security) if satisfying that A cannot distinguish
one keyword from another even though A is allowed to adaptively
conduct some queries with restrictions.
Setup. As Game 1.
Phase 1. A is allowed to issue the following queries.
Key Query. C runs the KeyGenδ,KeyGenξ algorithm and
returns the public key for the target description. For non-
target descriptions, C returns the public/secret key pairs.
Trapdoor Query. A sends w to C. C runs the Trapdoor algo-
rithm and returns the trapdoor T .
Switch Key Query. A sends pkδ, pkξ, w to C, where pkξ is the
target public key. C runs the Swith KeyGen algorithm and
returns the switch key rkδ−ξ , where δ and ξ are also from
different domains.
Challenge. Once A decides that the Phase 1 is over, it
submits two equal-length keywords w0, w1, any message
M and two target description δ∗, ξ∗. A is restricted that he
has only queried the switch key from any δ to ξ∗, and has
queried neither the secret key for δ∗, ξ∗ nor the trapdoor for
w0, w1 under the description δ∗, ξ∗. C flips a coin  ∈ {0, 1}
and returns the searchable ciphertext for (δ∗, w) and the
switch searchable ciphertext for (ξ∗, w).
Phase 2. As Phase 1 with the condition established in
challenge phase.
Guess. A outputs a guess ′ for .
A wins Game1 if ′ = .
6 THE PROPOSED CDSS PROTOCOL
6.1 Bilinear Pairing Operation [31]
Let G and GT be two cyclic groups of the same prime order
p. We say a map e : G × G → GT is a symmetric bilinear
pairing if
(1) for all g ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp, we have e
(
ga, gb
)
=
e(g, g)
ab.
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(2) e (g, g) 6= 1 and it is efficient to compute e (g, g) for
all g ∈ G.
A bilinear pairing group system PG = (G,GT , e, p) is
composed of the above defined objects.
6.2 Our Design
Our CDSS protocol is built from a pairing group system PG.
Let g, h be the generators of G and H1, H2 be cryptographic
(collision resistant) hash functions, whereH1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp
and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G. We denote the public parameters as
pp = (g, h,H1, H2,PG). All of algorithms are built atop pp.
We present the CDSS protocol in Fig. 3 and its details as
follows.
Setup. The service provider initializes the switching
system, where the service provider is trusted and manages
both IBE mechanism and PKE mechanism. When used in
the scenario described in Section 1, the service provider is
Department of Health/Medicine. It selects α ∈ Zp and sets
msk = α, mpk = gα. pp and mpk are implicitly included
in the following algorithms.
The service provider also shares a distinct secret value
z ∈ Zp with each sender.
KeyGen. This algorithm considers both IBE case and PKE
case. This algorithm is run by both the service provider and
the user in different encryption mechanisms.
• For IBE case, it outputs dID = g
1
α+H1(ID) , hID =
h
1
α+H1(ID) . The user also chooses β, u ∈ Zp
and sets skIBE = (dID, β, u), pkIBE =
(hu, hβ , g
β
u , h
u
β , hID).
• For PKE case, the user selects x, y ∈ Zp
and outputs skPKE = (x, y), pkPKE =
(gx, gxy, g
1
x , gy, g
y
x , hy, h
x
y ).
Encrypt. This algorithm considers both IBE case and PKE
case. This algorithm is run by the sender under different
encryption mechanisms.
• For IBE case, it selects r ∈ Zp and computes EIBE as
EIBE =

XI1 = g
−r(α+H1(ID)),
XI2 =M · e (g, g)r ,
XI3 = h
ru,
XI4 = e
(
hβ , H2(w)
)r
,
XI5 = H2(w)
rz.
• For PKE case, it selects s ∈ Zp and computes EPKE
as
EPKE =

XP1 = e(g, g)
s,
XP2 =M · e(g, g)xs,
XP3 = g
−xys,
XP4 = g
ys,
XP5 = h
yzs,
XP6 = e (g
x, H2(w))
s
,
XP7 = H2(w)
sz.
Switch KeyGen. This algorithm considers both IBE-PKE
case and PKE-IBE case. This algorithm is run by the service
provider.
• For IBE-PKE case, it selects t ∈ Zp and outputs a
switch key rkIBE−PKE as
rkIBE−PKE =

rkI-P1 = g
1
x(α+H1(ID))ht,
rkI-P2 = (g
x)
(α+H1(ID))t
u ,
rkI-P3 = g
ty
x ,
rkI-P4 = e (g,H2(w))
t
,
rkI-P5 = h
xu
yz .
• For PKE-IBE case, it selects t ∈ Zp and outputs a
switch key rkPKE−IBE as
rkPKE−IBE =

rkP -I1 = g
1
y hv,
rkP -I2 = h
xvhzID,
rkP -I3 = h
uv
β ,
rkP -I4 = e (h,H2(w))
v
,
rkP -I5 = g
βy
uz .
Then the service provider can send the switch key to the
switch party.
Switch. This algorithm considers both IBE-PKE case and
PKE-IBE case. This algorithm is run by any switch party
who has the switch key. Note that the switch party holds
only the switch key but not msk, and hence cannot decrypt
to obtain the message.
• For IBE-PKE case, it outputs the ciphertex-
t EIBE−PKE as
EIBE−PKE =

XP1 = X
I-P
1 = e
((
XI1
)−1
, rkI-P1
)
,
XP2 = X
I-P
2 = X
I
2 · e
(
XI3 , rk
I-P
2
)
,
XP4 = X
I-P
3 = X
I
3 · rkI-P3 ,
XP6 = X
I-P
4 = e
(
XI5 , rk
I-P
5
) · rkI-P4 .
• For PKE-IBE case, it outputs the ciphertex-
t EPKE−IBE as
EPKE−IBE =

XI1 = X
P -I
1 = X
P
5 ,
XI2 = X
P -I
2 = X
P
2 · e
(
XP3 , rk
P -I
1
) ·
e
(
XP4 , rk
P -I
2
)
,
XI3 = X
P -I
3 = X
P
4 · rkP -I3 ,
XI4 = X
P -I
4 = e
(
XP7 , rk
P -I
5
) · rkP -I4 .
Trapdoor. This algorithm considers both IBE case and
PKE case. This algorithm is run by the user in different
encryption mechanisms.
• For IBE case, it outputs the trapdoor T IBE =
H2(w)
β
u .
• For PKE case, it outputs the trapdoor TPKE =
H2(w)
x
y .
Test. This algorithm considers both IBE case and PKE
case. This algorithm is run by the server.
• For IBE case, it outputs 1 and returns the search result
if e
(
XI3 , T
IBE
)
= XI4 .
• For PKE case, it outputs 1 and returns the search
result if e
(
XP4 , T
PKE
)
= XP6 .
Decrypt. This algorithm considers both IBE case and
PKE case. This algorithm is run by the user in different
encryption mechanisms.
• For IBE case, it outputs M = XI2 · e
(
XI1 , dID
)
.
• For PKE case, it outputs M = X
P
2
(XP1 )
x .
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Algorithm IBE Switching PKE
Setup Share pp,mpk.
KeyGen Compute dID, hID .Compute skIBE , pkIBE . Compute skPKE , pkPKE .
Encrypt Compute E
IBE = Compute EPKE =(
XI1 , X
I
2 , · · · , XI5
)
,
(
XP1 , X
P
2 , · · · , XP7
)
,
Switch KeyGen
IBE→ PKE
Compute rkIBE-PKE =(
rkI-P1 , rkI-P2 , rkI-P3 , rkI-P4 , rkI-P5
)
,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Switch Compute E
IBE-PKE =(
XP1 , X
P
2 , X
P
4 , X
P
6
)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Switch KeyGen
PKE←IBE
Compute rkPKE-IBE =(
rkP -I1 , rkP -I2 , rkP -I3 , rkP -I4 , rkP -I5
)
,
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Switch Compute E
PKE-IBE =(
XI1 , X
I
2 , X
I
3 , X
I
4
)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Trapdoor Compute T IBE Compute TPKE
Test Check Check
e
(
XI3 , T
IBE
)
= XI4 . e
(
XP4 , T
PKE
)
= XP6 .
Decryption Decrypt Decrypt
M = XI2 · e
(
XI1 , dID
)
. M = X
P
2
(XP1 )
x .
Fig. 3: Cross-Domain Encryption Switching with Keyword Search Protocol.
Correctness. We can verify the correctness as follows.
e
(
XI3 , T
IBE
)
= e
(
gys · huvβ , H2(w) βu
)
= e (g,H2(w))
ysβ
u e (h,H2(w))
v
= e
(
XP7 , rk
P -I
5
) · rkP -I4
= XI4 ,
e
(
XP4 , T
PKE
)
= e
(
hrug
ty
x , H2(w)
x
y
)
= e
(
XI5 , rk
I-P
5
) · rkI-P4
= XP6 ,
XI2 · e
(
XI1 , dID
)
=Me (g, g)
xs · e
(
g−xys, g
1
y hv
)
·
e
(
gys, hxvh
z
α+H1(ID)
)
·
e
(
hyzs, g
1
α+H1(ID)
)
=M,
XP2
(XP1 )
x =
M ·e(g,g)r·e
(
hru,(gx)
(α+H1(ID))t
u
)
e
(
gr(α+H1(ID)),g
1
x(α+H1(ID)) ht
)x
=M.
7 SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyze the security of our CDSS in two directions,
namely from IBE to PKE and from PKE to IBE, respective-
ly. Before proceeding to the proof, we introduce the hard
problems.
7.1 Hard Problems
The security of our proposed CDSS scheme is reduced to
three hard assumptions, which are specific general decision-
al Diffie-Hellman exponent (GDDHE for short) assumptions
introduced by Boneh, Boyen and Goh in [31]. We present
them as follows.
Let g0, P be the generator of G and f(a), q(a) be two
coprime polynomials with the degree deg f(a) = n and
deg q(a) = 1.
Problem 1.
Instance : g
f(a)q(a)
0 , g
x2f(a)q(a)
0 , g
x2yf(a)q(a)
0 , g
x2af(a)q(a)
0 ,
g
xq(a)
0 , · · · , gxa
n−1q(a)
0 , g
xf(a)q(a)
0 , g
xaf(a)q(a)
0 ,
g
yq(a)
0 , · · · , gya
n−1q(a)
0 , g
yf(a)
0 , g
yf(a)q(a)
0 ,
g
(1+kyz)f(a)
0 , g
(1+kyz)q(a)
0 , · · · , g(1+kyz)a
n−1q(a)
0 ,
e(g0, P )
xf(a), e(g0, P )
xq(a), · · · , e(g0, P )xan−1q(a),
g
ky2zf(a)q(a)
0 , g
kxf(a)q(a)
0 , g
kxzf(a)q(a)
0 ,
g
xyf(a)q(a)
0 , g
rkyzf(a)q(a)
0 , e(g0, P )
rkyzf(a)q(a),
g
kyzq(a)
0 , · · · , gkyza
n−1q(a)
0 , g
rxf(a)q2(a)
0 , P
rz, T.
Output : Distinguish T = e(g0, g0)rx
2f2(a)q2(a) or a random
element in GT .
Problem 2.
Instance : gxuy0 , g
x2uy
0 , g
x2uy2
0 , g
uy
0 , g
xuy2
0 , g
uy2
0 , g
βxy
0 , g
x2y
0 , g
bxuy
0 ,
grxuy0 , g
rbxuyz
0 , g
rxuyz
0 , h
rβuyz
0 , e(g0, g0)
rbβ2xuy2z,
hβ
2yz
0 , h
uyz
0 , h
βy2z
0 , h
βxz
0 , h
βxu
0 , e(g0, h0)
rβ2xuy2z, T
Output : Distinguish T = e(g0, h0)rbβ
2xuy2z or a random
element in GT .
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Problem 3.
Instance : g
xyzf(a)q(a)
0 , g
xyzaf(a)q(a)
0 , g
xy2zf(a)q(a)
0 ,
g
xyzq(a)
0 , · · · , gxyza
n−1q(a)
0 , g
x2y2zf(a)q(a)
0 ,
g
x2yzf(a)q(a)
0 , e(g0, g0)
sx2y2z2f2(a)q2(a),
g
yzf(a)q(a)
0 , g
y2zf(a)q(a)
0 , g
xy2f(a)q(a)
0 ,
g
(1+k)xzf(a)q(a)
0 , g
kyzf(a)+kx2zf(a)q(a)
0 ,
e(g0, P )
kxyzf(a)q(a), e(g0, P )
sx2yzf(a)q(a),
g
sxy2zf(a)q(a)
0 , g
sx2y2zf(a)q(a)
0 , g
sky2zf(a)q(a)
0 ,
g
kxf(a)q(a)
0 , g
ky2f(a)q(a)
0 , g
kxzf(a)q(a)
0 ,
g
kyf(a)
0 , g
kyq(a)
0 , · · · , gkya
n−1q(a)
0 , P
sz, T
Output : Distinguish T = e(g0, g0)sx
3y2z2f2(a)q2(a) or a
random element in GT .
The generic complexity of the above hard problems can
be covered by the analysis in [31] as it fits the general
framework. Boneh, Boyen and Goh [31] also defined the
hardness conditions and any problem fulfilling their condi-
tions can be seen as one of GDDHE problems. It is quite
clear that the proposed three hard problems satisfy the
hardness condition, that is, the goal is independent of the
given instance.
7.2 Data Secrecy of CDSS from IBE to PKE
When switching from IBE to PKE, the decryption needs the
secret key x. The adversary cannot obtain x even if he/she
knows switch keys. This means that it is possible for the
adversary to distinguish the message from the ciphertext or
the switch ciphertext. Hence, CPA security holds in CDSS
protocol from IBE to PKE.
Theorem 1. The CDSS protocol from IBE to PKE achieves the
CPA security under the Game 1 if the Problem 1 is hard.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A can break our protocol from
IBE to PKE in Game 1 with a non-negligible advantage,
there exists an simulator B, who receives Problem 1 in-
stances and attempts to use A to solve the Problem 1 with
a non-negligible advantage.
Setup. B runs the Setup algorithm and publishes the system
parameters. B implicitly sets α = a, g = gxf(a)q(a)0 , h =
g
kyzf(a)q(a)
0 , where
f(a) = (a+ a1) · · · (a+ an), q(a) = (a+ a∗).
We also define fi(a) =
f(a)
a+ai
. B computes gα = gxaf(a)q(a)0 .
Then B issues the public parameter pp = (g, h) and the
master public key mpk = gα to A.
H1-Query. B maintains a H1 list L(IDi, ci, ai, hi), which
are initially empty. Upon receiving an H1 query for IDi, if
IDi is in the list L, B returns the corresponding hi to A.
Otherwise, B picks a bit ci ∈ {0, 1} and sets the hash value
hi as follows.
hi = H1(IDi) =
{
a∗, if ci = 0,
ai, if ci = 1.
Then B adds (IDi, ci, ai, hi) to the list and returns hi to A.
H2-Query. B maintains a H2 list L′(wi, c′i, bi, h′i), which are
initially empty. Upon receiving anH2 query forwi, ifwi is in
the list L′, B returns the corresponding h′i to A. Otherwise,
B picks a bit c′i ∈ {0, 1}, bi ∈ Zp and sets the hash value
h′i = H2(wi) = P
bi . Then B adds (wi, c′i, bi, h′i) to the list
and returns h′i to A.
Phase 1. A can make queries as follows.
PKE Key Query. For target public key pkPKE =(
gx, gxy, g
1
x , gy, g
y
x , hy, h
x
y
)
, B can compute
gx = g
x2f(a)q(a)
0 , g
xy = g
x2yf(a)q(a)
0 , g
1
x = g
f(a)q(a)
0 ,
gy = g
xyf(a)q(a)
0 , g
y
x = g
yf(a)q(a)
0 ,
hy = g
ky2zf(a)q(a)
0 , h
x
y = g
kxzf(a)q(a)
0 ,
which are computable from the instance. Then B send-
s pkPKE to A. For non-target PKE key, B runs the
KeyGenPKE algorithm to generate any public/secret key
pair.
IBE Key Query. A sends IDi to B for the IBE secret
key query. B runs the KeyGenIBE algorithm and returns
the secret key and public key. Let (IDi, ci, ai, hi) be the
corresponding tuple on the L list.
For the secret key query,
• If ci = 0, abort.
• If ci = 1, we have hi = H1(IDi) = ai. B responds
the IBE secret key for IDi with dIDi = g
xfi(a)q(a)
0 ,
where
dIDi = g
1
α+H1(IDi) = g
xf(a)q(a)
α+ai
0 = g
xfi(a)q(a)
0 .
dIDi is computable from the elements
g
xq(a)
0 , g
xaq(a)
0 , · · · , gxa
n−1q(a)
0 in the instance,
B randomly selects β, u ∈ Zp and returns skIBE =
{dIDi , β, u} to A.
For the public key query,
• If ci = 0, we have hi = H1(IDi) = a∗. B re-
sponds the IBE public key for IDi with h
1
α+H1(IDi) =
g
kyzf(a)
0 .
• If ci = 1, we have hi = H1(IDi) = ai. B re-
sponds the IBE public key for IDi with h
1
α+H1(IDi) =
g
kyzfi(a)q(a)
0 , which is computable from the elements
g
kyzq(a)
0 , g
kyzaq(a)
0 , · · · , gkyza
n−1q(a)
0 in the instance,
B also computes hu, hβ , g βu , huβ and returns pkIBE =
{hu, hβ , g βu , huβ , h 1α+H1(IDi) } to A.
Switch Key Query. A sends the target PKE public key
pkPKE , the identity IDi and the keyword wi to B. B runs
the Switch KeyGen algorithm and responds the switch key
rkIBE−PKE . Let (IDi, ci, ai, hi) be the corresponding tuple
on the L list and (wi, c′i, bi, h
′
i) be the corresponding tuple
on the L′ list.
• If ci = 0, we have hi = H1(IDi) = a∗, h′i =
H2(wi) = P
bi . B chooses t′ ∈ Zp and responds the
switch key as
rkI-P1 = g
(1+kyz)f(a)
0 · ht
′
,
rkI-P2 = g
x2f(a)q(a)
u
0 · g
x2f(a)q(a)(a+a∗)t′
u
0 ,
rkI-P3 = g
yf(a)
0 · g
yt′
x ,
rkI-P4 = e (g0, P )
xf(a)bi · e (g, P )t′bi ,
rkI-P5 = g
kxf(a)q(a)u
0
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We implicitly set t = 1q(a) + t
′ and verify it as
rkI-P1 = g
1
x(α+H1(IDi))ht
= g
(1+kyz)f(a)
0 · ht
′
,
rkI-P2 = g
x(α+H1(IDi))t
u
= g
x2f(a)q(a)
u
0 · g
x2f(a)q(a)(a+a∗)t′
u
0 ,
rkI-P3 = g
ty
x = g
yf(a)
0 · g
yt′
x ,
rkI-P4 = e(g,H2(wi))
t
= e (g0, P )
xf(a)bi · e (g, P )t′bi ,
rkI-P5 = g
βy
uz = g
kxf(a)q(a)u
0
• If ci = 1, we have hi = H1(IDi) = ai, h′i =
H2(wi) = P
bi . B chooses t′ ∈ Zp and responds the
switch key as
rkI-P1 = g
(1+kyz)fi(a)q(a)
0 · ht
′
,
rkI-P2 = g
x2f(a)q(a)
u
0 · g
x2f(a)q(a)(a+ai)t
′
u
0 ,
rkI-P3 = g
yfi(a)q(a)
0 · g
yt′
x ,
rkI-P4 = e (g0, P )
xfi(a)q(a)bi · e (g, P )t′bi ,
rkI-P5 = g
kxf(a)q(a)u
0
We implicitly set t = 1a+ai + t
′ and verify it as
rkI-P1 = g
1
x(α+H1(IDi))ht
= g
(1+kyz)fi(a)q(a)
0 · ht
′
,
rkI-P2 = g
x(α+H1(IDi))t
u
= g
x2f(a)q(a)
u
0 · g
x2f(a)q(a)(a+ai)t
′
u
0 ,
rkI-P3 = g
ty
x = g
yfi(a)q(a)
0 · g
yt′
x ,
rkI-P4 = e(g,H2(wi))
t
= e (g0, P )
xfi(a)q(a)bi · e (g, P )t′bi ,
rkI-P5 = h
xu
yz = g
kxf(a)q(a)u
0 .
Challenge. A outputs ID∗, two messages M0,M1 and a
keyword w∗ on which it wishes to be challenged. Here we
restrict that A is only allowed to query the switch key for
the target PKE public key pkPKE . Let (ID∗, c∗, a∗, h∗) be
the corresponding tuple on the L list and (w∗, c′∗, b∗, h′∗)
be the corresponding tuple on the L′ list. we have h′∗ =
H2(w
∗) = P b
∗ B select  ∈ {0, 1} and responds the
challenge ciphertext to A as follows.
• If c∗ = 1, abort.
• If c∗ = 0, we have h∗ = H1(ID∗) = a∗. B responds
the challenge ciphertext EIBE as
XI1 = g
−rxf(a)q2(a)
0 , X
I
2 =M · T,XI3 = grkyzf(a)q(a)u0 ,
XI4 = e(g0, P )
rkyzf(a)q(a)βb∗ , XI5 = P
rzb∗ ,
If T = e (g0, g0)
rx2f2(a)q2(a), one can verify the cor-
rectness of the above ciphertext by
XI1 = g
−r(α+H1(ID∗)) = g−rxf(a)q
2(a)
0 ,
XI2 =M · e (g, g)r
=M · e (g0, g0)rx
2f2(a)q2(a)
=M · T,
XI3 = h
ru = g
rkyzf(a)q(a)u
0 ,
XI4 = e(h
β , H2(w
∗))r
= e(g0, P )
rkyzf(a)q(a)βb∗ ,
XI5 = H2(w
∗)rz = P rzb
∗
,
Therefore, EIBE is a valid challenge ciphertext.
If T is a random element in GT , the challenge ciphertext
will be random from the A’s view.
Then A can generate the switch ciphertext EIBE−PKE
with the received challenge ciphertext and the switch key.
Phase 2. As Phase 1 with the condition established in
challenge phase.
Guess. Eventually A outputs a guess ′ ∈ {0, 1} for .
7.3 Search Keyword Secrecy of CDSS from IBE to PKE
When switching from IBE to PKE, the test needs the trap-
door TPKE = H2(w)
x
y . The adversary cannot obtain TPKE
even if he/she can queries other secret keys or trapdoors.
This means that it is possible for the adversary to guess the
keyword from the ciphertext or switch ciphertext. Hence,
CKA security holds in CDSS protocol from IBE to PKE.
Theorem 2. The CDSS protocol from IBE to PKE achieves the
CKA security under the Game 2 if the Problem 2 is hard.
Proof. In this proof, we assume that the adversary cannot
be a valid sender who has got the secret value z. Then if
an adversary A can break our protocol from IBE to PKE
in Game 2 with a non-negligible advantage, there exists an
simulator B, who receives Problem 2 instances and can solve
the Problem 2 with a non-negligible advantage.
Setup. B runs the Setup algorithm and publishes the system
parameters. B implicitly sets g = gxuy0 , h = hβyz0 and choos-
es α ∈ Zp. Then B issues the public parameter pp = (g, h)
and the master public key mpk = gα to A.
H2-Query. B maintains a H2 list L′(wi, c′i, bi, h′i), which are
initially empty. Upon receiving anH2 query forwi, ifwi is in
the listL′, B returns the corresponding h′i toA. Otherwise, B
picks a bit c′i ∈ {0, 1} and sets the hash value h′i as follows.
h′i = H2(wi) =
{
gbgbi , if c′i = 0,
gbi , if c′i = 1.
Then B adds (wi, c′i, bi, h′i) to the list and returns h′i to A.
Phase 1. A can make queries as follows.
Key Query. For target public key
pkPKE =
(
gx, gxy, g
1
x , gy, g
y
x , hy, h
x
y
)
,
pkIBE =
(
hu, hβ , g
β
u , h
u
β
)
,
B computes gx = gx2uy0 , gxy = gx
2uy2
0 , g
1
x = guy0 , g
y =
gx0 , g
y
x = guy
2
0 , h
y = hβy
2z
0 , h
x
y = hβxz0 and h
u =
huβyz0 , h
β = hβ
2yz
0 , g
β
u = gβxy0 , h
u
β = huyz0 , which can be
from the instance.
For non-target public key, B runs the
KeyGenPKE ,KeyGenIBE algorithms to generate
public/secret key pairs, which are independent of the
target one. Then B sends the public key to A.
Trapdoor Query. A sends wi to B for the trapdoor query.
B runs the Trapdoor algorithm and returns the trapdoor T .
Let (wi, ci, ai, hi) be the corresponding tuple on the L′ list.
• If ci = 0, abort.
• If ci = 1, we have h′i = H2(wi) = g
bi . B responds
the trapdoor for wi with T IBE = g
βxybi
0 , T
PKE =
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gx
2ubi
0 , where T
IBE = H2(wi)
β
u = gb
2xzai
0 , T
PKE =
H2(wi)
x
y = gx
2ubi
0 .
Both trapdoors can be obtained from the elements in
the instance,
Switch Key Query. A sends pkPKE , pkIBE , wi to B. B
runs the Switch KeyGen algorithm and responds the switch
key rkIBE−PKE . Let (wi, c′i, bi, h
′
i) be the corresponding
tuple on the L′ list. B chooses α, t ∈ Zp and responds the
switch key as
rkI-P1 =
(
g
1
x
) 1
(α+H1(ID)) ht, rkI-P2 =
(
gx
2y
0
)(α+H1(ID))t
,
rkI-P3 =
(
g
y
x
)t
, rkI-P4 = e (g, h
′
i)
t
, rkI-P5 = h
βxy
0 .
Challenge. A outputs pkIBE , pkPKE and two same-length
keywords w0, w1 on which it wishes to be challenged. Here
we restrict that A is only allowed to query the switch key
for the target PKE public key pkPKE . Let (wi, c′i, bi, h
′
i) be
the corresponding tuple on the L′ list. B select  ∈ {0, 1}
and responds the challenge searchable ciphertext to A as
follows.
• If c∗ = 1, abort.
• If c∗ = 0, we have h′ = H2(w) = g
bgb . B responds
the challenge searchable ciphertext EIBE as
XI1 = (g
rxuy
0 )
α+H1(ID) , XI2 =Me (g0, g0)
rx2u2y2
,
XI3 = h
rβuyz
0 , X
I
4 = T · e (g0, h0)rβ
2xuy2zb ,
XI5 = g
rbxuyz
0 g
rxuyzb
0 ,
If T = e (g0, h0)
rbβ2xuy2z , one can verify the correct-
ness as
XI1 = g
−r(α+H1(ID)) = (grxuy0 )
α+H1(ID) ,
XI2 =M · e (g, g)r =Me (g0, g0)rx
2u2y2
,
XI3 = h
ru = hrβuyz0 ,
XI4 = e(h
β , H2(w
∗))r
= e
(
hβ
2yz
0 , g
bxuy
0 g
xuyb
0
)r
= T · e (g0, h0)rβ
2xuy2zb ,
XI5 = H2(w
∗)rz =
(
gbgb
)r
= grbxuyz0 g
rxuyzb
0 .
Therefore, EIBE is a valid challenge ciphertext.
If T is a random element in GT , the challenge ciphertext
will be random from the A’s view.
Then A can generate the switch ciphertext EIBE−PKE
with the received challenge ciphertext and the switch key.
Phase 2. As Phase 1 with the condition established in
challenge phase.
Guess. Eventually A outputs a guess ′ ∈ {0, 1} for .
7.4 Data and Search Keyword Secrecy from PKE to IBE
When switching from PKE to IBE, the decryption needs the
secret key dID = g
1
α+H1(ID) . The adversary cannot obtain
dID even if he/she can query other secret keys or switch
keys due to the exponent-inversion structure of dID. This
means that it is possible for the adversary to distinguish the
message from the ciphertext or the switch ciphertext. Hence,
CPA security holds in CDSS protocol from PKE to IBE.
Theorem 3. The CDSS from PKE to IBE achieves the CPA
security under the Game 1 if the Problem 3 is hard.
When switching from PKE to IBE, the test needs the
trapdoor T IBE = H2(w)
β
u . The adversary cannot obtain
T IBE even if he/she can query other secret keys trapdoors.
This means that it is possible for the adversary to guess the
keyword from the ciphertext or switch ciphertext. Hence,
CKA security holds in CDSS protocol from PKE to IBE.
Theorem 4. The CDSS protocol from PKE to IBE achieves the
CKA security under the Game 2 if the Problem 2 is hard.
The proofs are similar to Theorem 1 and 2.
8 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
We only present the efficiency analysis for our CDSS pro-
tocol due to no comparable protocols in the literature,
where the efficiency is analyzed from both theoretical and
practical levels. We consider the computational and commu-
nication costs for a trusted service provider, a system user,
and a server. To better show the theoretical computation-
al/communication cost ratio accordingly, we use the four ta-
bles (TABLE 2-TABLE 5) to illustrate different phases, differ-
ent entities and different channels in a IBE→PKE/PKE→IBE
switching system.
To present a fair computational analysis, we denote an
exponent cost in G and a pairing cost in GT as exp and
pair, respectively. TABLE 2 lists the analysis when switching
from IBE to PKE. From TABLE 2, we can see that most
of the pairing costs are offloaded to the server and the
switch party. In terms of pairing operation, a user needs
to take 3 pairings cost of which one is for the decryption
and two is for encryption. When switching from PKE to
IBE, a user costs only 2 pairings, less than 50% of the total
pairings cost and meanwhile, there is no extra cost for the
service provider in KeyGen algorithm. The detailed analysis
is presented in TABLE 3. In both tables, we also show the
total computational cost in a PKE-IBE/IBE-PKE switching
system, which is denoted as “Total”.
In the theoretical communication analysis, we use mpk,
msk, pk, sk, CT , T , rk to denote master secret key, master
public key, public key, secret key, ciphertext, search token
and switch token, respectively. We further use |Zp|, |G| and
|GT | to denote the size of an element in groups Zp, G and
GT , respectively. We show the analysis in TABLE 4 and
TABLE 5 in terms of the IBE → PKE switching and the
PKE → IBE switching. Similar to the computational cost
analysis, we also list total communication cost in a PKE-
IBE/IBE-PKE switching system. From a system user’s point
of view, the communication complexity in switching and
search are significantly cost-effective w.r.t. both of the tables,
in which the user only needs to send an element in G to the
server to fulfill a search, while it can request 4|G| + |GT |
communication cost in switch. The most expensive part
relies on ciphertext, taking 2|GT | and 3|GT | in IBE → PKE
and PKE→ IBE, respectively.
We implement our CDSS on a Mac pro with 2.2GHz
Intel Core i7 CPU and 16GB 1600 MHz DDR3 memory.
In our implementation, we use PBC library1, which is one
1. https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
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TABLE 2: Theoretical IBE→ PKE Computational Cost
IBE → PKE Computational Cost
Cost Setup KeyGen Enc Switch KeyGen Switch Trapdoor Test Dec
exp 1 6 6 6 0 1 0 0
pair 0 0 2 1 3 0 1 1
Service provider (Setup) 1exp
Service provider (KeyGen) 6exp
Server (Test) 1pair
Service provider (Switch keygen) 1pair
Switch party (Switch) 3pair
User 13exp+ 3pair
Total 20exp+ 8pair
TABLE 3: Theoretical PKE→ IBE Computational Cost
PKE → IBE Computational Cost
Cost Setup KeyGen Enc Switch KeyGen Switch Trapdoor Test Dec
exp 1 7 8 7 0 1 0 1
pair 0 0 3 1 3 0 1 0
Servise provider (Setup) 1exp
Servise provider (KeyGen) 0
Server (test) 1pair
Service provider (Switch keygen) 1pair
Switch party (Switch) 3pair
User 24exp+ 2pair
Total 25exp+ 7pair
TABLE 4: Theoretical IBE→ PKE Communication Cost
IBE→ PKE Communication Cost
Groups mpk msk pk sk T rk CT
Zq 0 1 0 2 0 0 0
G 1 0 5 1 1 4 3
GT 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Service provider→ User (KeyGen) 2|Zp|+ 6|G|
User→ Server (Enc) 3|G|+ 2|GT |
Service provider→ Switch party (Switch) 4|G|+ |GT |
User→ Server (Search) |G|
Total 2|Zp|+ 14|G|+ 3|GT |
TABLE 5: Theoretical PKE→ IBE Communication Cost
PKE → IBE Communication Cost
Groups mpk msk pk sk T rk CT
Zq 0 1 0 2 0 0 0
G 1 0 7 0 1 4 4
GT 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
Service provider → User (KeyGen) 0
User → Server (Enc) 4|G|+ 3|GT |
Service provider → Switch party (Switch) 4|G|+ |GT |
User → Server (Search) |G|
Total 9|G|+ 4|GT |
of the most widely used library for pairing operation. We
choose the symmetric pairing which is constructed based
on the curve y2 = x3 + x over the finite field Fp for some
prime number p satsifying p = 3 mod 4, and both G1 and
G2 are the group of points on E(Fp). Table 6 shows the
computational cost for each of the operations in our system.
The experiment shows the scalability of our system
regarding the number of users and files during the process.
For the simplicity of the demonstration, we apply the one
keyword search scenario with multiple files and multiple
users to test our computational cost and the communication
cost. For the computational cost, we perform the encryption,
decryption and the corresponding switching operations for
20000 independent files. And we categorize the cost for the
IBE, PKE and the Switching systems accordingly. Figure 4
shows that the switching entity is responsible for most of
the computational cost compared with the IBE and PKE
calculation. When the number of the files reaches 20000, IBE,
PKE and Switching entity systems will take around 300, 300
and 850 seconds to finish the process.
For the communication cost, we consider different
transfer channels, i.e., Service provider → user, Service
provider→ Switch party and User→ server. Fig. 5 shows
the communication cost from the service provider to user,
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TABLE 6: Experimental Computational Cost for each operation
IBE→ PKE IBE→ PKE PKE→ IBE PKE→ IBE
KeyGen Encrypt Switch-KeyGen Switch Switch-KeyGen Switch Trapdoor Test Encryption
IBE 0.007792s 0.011997s - - - - 0.001959s 0.004679s 0.006420ss
Switching - - 0.010252s 0.002614s 0.010879s 0.018809s - - -
PKE 0.010879s 0.009694s - - - - 0.001959s 0.004936s 0.003444s
Fig. 4: Computational cost for three systems
where the number of users is up to 6000. Fig. 6 shows
the communication cost from the service provider to switch
party, where the number of ciphertexts is up to 6000. Fig. 7
shows the communication cost from user to server, where
the number of ciphertexts is also up to 6000.
As one would expect that as the number of users and
files grow large, the corresponding computational and com-
munication cost grow in a linear pattern, which demon-
strates the scalability of our system. While we demonstrate
the single thread scenario, multiply users would query the
service at the same time. For example in our implemented
system, if 3000 users simultaneously asked for the switching
service on 5000 files in the IBE to PKE scenario, then around
2M data will need to be transmitted to the switching entity,
and the switching entity will take around 3 minutes in
average to process all the requests. Thus as the service
requirement grows, switching entity will be become a bottle-
neck in performance. In the future, we can consider to build
hierarchical switching entity to disperse the workload.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
C. Dong is supported by an EPSRC grant (Grant No.
EP/M013561/2). It is also supported in part by the National
Research Foundation, Prime Ministers Office, Singapore, un-
der its Corporate Laboratory@University Scheme, National
University of Singapore, and Singapore Telecommunication-
s Ltd., in part by National Natural Science Foundation of
China under Grant No. 61702212 and the research funds of
CCNU from colleges basic research and operation of MOE
under Grand No. CCNU16A05040.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Blaze, G. Bleumer, and M. Strauss, “Divertible protocols and
atomic proxy cryptography,” in EUROCRYPT ’98, ser. LNCS, vol.
1403, 1998, pp. 127–144.
[2] R. Canetti and S. Hohenberger, “Chosen-ciphertext secure proxy
re-encryption,” in CCS 2007, 2007, pp. 185–194.
[3] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Attribute-based
encryption for fine-grained access control of encrypted data,” in
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communica-
tions security. Acm, 2006, pp. 89–98.
[4] J. Weng, R. H. Deng, S. Liu, and K. Chen, “Chosen-ciphertext se-
cure bidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes without pairings,”
Inf. Sci., vol. 180, no. 24, pp. 5077–5089, 2010.
[5] D. Boneh, G. D. Crescenzo, R. Ostrovsky, and G. Persiano, “Public
key encryption with keyword search,” in EUROCRYPT 2004, ser.
LNCS, vol. 3027, 2004, pp. 506–522.
[6] G. Couteau, T. Peters, and D. Pointcheval, “Encryption switching
protocols,” in CRYPTO 2016, ser. LNCS, vol. 9814, 2016, pp. 308–
338.
[7] G. Castagnos, L. Imbert, and F. Laguillaumie, “Encryption switch-
ing protocols revisited: Switching modulo p,” in CRYPTO 2017,
ser. LNCS, vol. 10401, 2017, pp. 255–287.
[8] G. Ateniese, K. Fu, M. Green, and S. Hohenberger, “Improved
proxy re-encryption schemes with applications to secure distribut-
ed storage,” ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 1–30,
2006.
[9] J. Weng, Y. Zhao, and G. Hanaoka, “On the security of a bidirec-
tional proxy re-encryption scheme from PKC 2010,” in PKC 2011,
ser. LNCS, vol. 6571, 2011, pp. 284–295.
[10] Q. Tang, “Type-based proxy re-encryption and its construction,”
in INDOCRYPT 2008, ser. LNCS, vol. 5365, 2008, pp. 130–144.
[11] C. Chu and W. Tzeng, “Identity-based proxy re-encryption with-
out random oracles,” in ISC 2007, ser. LNCS, vol. 4779, 2007, pp.
189–202.
[12] M. Green and G. Ateniese, “Identity-based proxy re-encryption,”
in ACNS 2007, ser. LNCS, vol. 4521, 2007, pp. 288–306.
[13] X. Liang, Z. Cao, H. Lin, and J. Shao, “Attribute based proxy re-
encryption with delegating capabilities,” in ASIACCS 2009, 2009,
pp. 276–286.
[14] T. Mizuno and H. Doi, “Hybrid proxy re-encryption scheme for
attribute-based encryption,” in Inscrypt 2009, ser. LNCS, vol. 6151,
2009, pp. 288–302.
[15] K. Liang, M. H. Au, W. Susilo, D. S. Wong, G. Yang, and Y. Yu,
“An adaptively cca-secure ciphertext-policy attribute-based proxy
re-encryption for cloud data sharing,” in ISPEC 2014, ser. LNCS,
vol. 8434, 2014, pp. 448–461.
[16] K. Liang, M. H. Au, J. K. Liu, W. Susilo, D. S. Wong, G. Yang,
T. V. X. Phuong, and Q. Xie, “A dfa-based functional proxy re-
encryption scheme for secure public cloud data sharing,” IEEE
Trans. Information Forensics and Security, vol. 9, no. 10, pp. 1667–
1680, 2014.
[17] J. Ning, X. Dong, Z. Cao, L. Wei, and X. Lin, “White-box traceable
ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption supporting flexible
attributes,” IEEE Trans. on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 10,
no. 6, pp. 1274–1288, 2015.
[18] J. Li, W. Yao, Y. Zhang, H. Qian, and J. Han, “Flexible and fine-
grained attribute-based data storage in cloud computing,” IEEE
Trans. on Services Computing, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 785–796, 2017.
[19] J. Ning, Z. Cao, X. Dong, K. Liang, H. Ma, and L. Wei, “Auditable
σ-time outsourced attribute-based encryption for access control in
cloud computing,” IEEE Trans. on Information Forensics and Security,
vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 94–105, 2018.
[20] J. Bethencourt, D. X. Song, and B. Waters, “New constructions
and practical applications for private stream searching (extended
abstract),” in (S&P 2006), 2006, pp. 132–139.
[21] D. Boneh and B. Waters, “Conjunctive, subset, and range queries
on encrypted data,” in TCC 2007, ser. LNCS, vol. 4392, 2007, pp.
535–554.
[22] S. Sedghi, P. van Liesdonk, S. Nikova, P. H. Hartel, and W. Jonker,
“Searching keywords with wildcards on encrypted data,” in SCN
2010, ser. LNCS, vol. 6280, 2010, pp. 138–153.
[23] M. Abdalla, M. Bellare, D. Catalano, E. Kiltz, T. Kohno, T. Lange,
J. Malone-Lee, G. Neven, P. Paillier, and H. Shi, “Searchable en-
1939-1374 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TSC.2018.2876849, IEEE
Transactions on Services Computing
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SERVICES COMPUTING 12
Fig. 5: Service provider→User Fig. 6: Service provider→Switch par-ty Fig. 7: User→Server-search
cryption revisited: Consistency properties, relation to anonymous
IBE, and extensions,” in CRYPTO 2005, ser. LNCS, vol. 3621, 2005,
pp. 205–222.
[24] H. S. Rhee, J. H. Park, W. Susilo, and D. H. Lee, “Improved search-
able public key encryption with designated tester,” in ASIACCS
2009, 2009, pp. 376–379.
[25] P. Jiang, Y. Mu, F. Guo, and Q. Wen, “Secure-channel free keyword
search with authorization in manager-centric databases,” Comput-
ers & Security, vol. 69, pp. 50–64, 2017.
[26] P. Jiang, Y. Mu, F. Guo, X. Wang, and Q. Wen, “Online/offline
ciphertext retrieval on resource constrained devices,” Comput. J.,
vol. 59, no. 7, pp. 955–969, 2016.
[27] J. Camenisch, M. Kohlweiss, A. Rial, and C. Sheedy, “Blind
and anonymous identity-based encryption and authorised private
searches on public key encrypted data,” in PKC 2009, ser. LNCS,
vol. 5443, 2009, pp. 196–214.
[28] P. Jiang, Y. Mu, F. Guo, and Q. Wen, “Public key encryption with
authorized keyword search,” in ACISP 2016, ser. LNCS, vol. 9723,
2016.
[29] J. Li, X. Lin, Y. Zhang, and J. Han, “Ksf-oabe: outsourced attribute-
based encryption with keyword search function for cloud stor-
age,” IEEE Trans. on Services Computing, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 715–725,
2017.
[30] J. Li, Y. Shi, and Y. Zhang, “Searchable ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption with revocation in cloud storage,” International
Journal of Communication Systems, vol. 30, no. 1, 2017.
[31] D. Boneh, X. Boyen, and E. Goh, “Hierarchical identity based
encryption with constant size ciphertext,” in EUROCRYPT 2005,
ser. LNCS, vol. 3494, 2005, pp. 440–456.
Peng Jiang received her Ph.D. degree from Bei-
jing University of Posts and Telecommunications
in 2017. She is currently an Assistant Professor
in the School of Computer Science and Technol-
ogy, Beijing Institute of Technology. Previously,
she was a Postdoctoral Researcher in The Hong
Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong. Her
research interests include information security,
applied cryptography and privacy concerns.
Jianting Ning received the Ph.D. degree from
Shanghai Jiao Tong University in 2016. He is
currently a research fellow at Department of
Computer Science, National University of Sin-
gapore. His research interests include applied
cryptography and cloud security, in particular,
Public Key Encryption, Attribute-Based Encryp-
tion, and Secure Multiparty Computation.
Kaitai Liang is an Assistant Professor in Secure
Systems at the University of Surrey, UK. He
received the Ph.D. degree from City University
of Hong Kong in 2014. His main research inter-
ests are applied cryptography, big data security,
blockchain, and privacy-enhancing technology.
He also has served as TPC for many renown
international security/privacy conferences, e.g.,
ACNS, TRUSTCOM, ASIACCS, ACISP.
Changyu Dong received a Ph.D. from Imperial
College London. He is currently a Senior Lec-
turer at the School of Computing Science, New-
castle University. His research interests include
applied cryptography, trust management, data
privacy and security policies. His recent work
focuses mostly on designing practical secure
computation protocols. The application domains
include e.g. secure cloud computing and privacy
preserving data mining.
Jiageng Chen received the PhD from Japan
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
(JAIST) in 2012. He was working as an Assistant
Professor in JAIST from 2012 to 2015. Currently,
he is an Associate Professor at the School of
Computer, Central China Normal University. He
is the Associate Editor of Journal of Information
Security and Application. His research areas in-
clude cryptography, especially algorithms, crypt-
analysis, data analysis and so on.
Zhenfu Cao (SM10) received the Ph.D. degree
from Harbin Institute of Technology in 1999. His
research interests mainly include Number The-
ory, Cryptography and Information Security. He
is currently a Distinguished Professor in East
China Normal University. He also serves as a
member of the expert panel of the National Na-
ture Science Fund of China. He is the leader of
Asia 3 Foresight Program and the key project of
National Natural Science Foundation of China.
He is a senior member of the IEEE.
